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Bad Faith Attorneys' Fees in Implied Private
Rights of Action Under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934
INTRODUCTION

The American legal system generally requires a prevailing litigant to assume the burden of paying for his own litigation connected legal services. 1 Courts, however, are not totally barred from
awarding attorneys' fees. Under court created exceptions to this
rule, attorneys' fees may be awarded to prevailing litigants. One of
these exceptions, the bad faith exception, allows fee shifting in

favor

of

a litigant

whose

opponent's

conduct

has

been

reprehensible.2
Awarding fees under this exception will not be justified in every
case where a party alleges bad faith conduct. For example, courts
applying the bad faith exception to implied private rights of action
under the Securities Exchange Act of 19343 generally deny attorneys' fees awards. This is because courts interpret section 28(a) the
1934 Act,' a damages limitation clause, as restricting recovery to

1. The British rule is contrary to the American rule. In England and most other European countries courts have statutory authority to award fees to a prevailing litigant. For a

history of the American and British rules see MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON DAMAGES § 60
(1935), 6 J. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE,
54.77[2] (2d ed. 1980); 10 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2675 (1973); Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of
Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 792 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Ehrenzweig]; Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929) [hereinafter cited as Goodhart];
Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 IowA L. REv. 75 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Kuenzel]; Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. COLO. L. REV. 202 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Stoebuck]; Walthall, Awards of
Attorneys' Fees in the Absence of Statute: Trends and Prospects in the Fifth Circuit, 10
CUM. L. REV. 359 (1979); Note, Attorney's Fees and the General Bad Faith Exception, 29
HASTINGS L.J. 319 (1977); Note, Recovery of Attorneys' Fees Under Rule 1ob-5, 53 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 320 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Rule lOb-5]; Comment, Theories of Recovering Attorney's Fees: Exceptions to the American Rule, 47 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 566 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Exceptions to the Rule]. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv.
Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975); F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel.
Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 126-30 (1974); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier
Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166
(1939); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 531-32 (1881); Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R., 186 F.2d 473, 481 (4th Cir. 1951).
2. See notes 23-35 infra and accompanying text.
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78111 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1976) The section states in part:
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actual damages. As attorneys' fees are usually not included in a
damages award, courts generally interpret the section to preclude
recovery of fees.' Even the courts suggesting that fees might be
allowed do not apply the standards for determining bad faith consistently with the application in non-securities litigation.,
The purpose of this note is to analyze the approach taken to the
bad faith exception in securities law cases and propose alternatives
that are consistent with the exception as it is applied in non-securities litigation. This note will begin with a discussion of the exceptions to the American rule and proceed to a discussion of how the
exceptions are applied in implied actions under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Finally, a proposed alternative standard for
awarding fees under the 1934 Act will be discussed.
THE AMERICAN RULE AND ITS ExCEPTIONS

The American Rule of Attorneys' Fees
The American rule denies fee shifting in favor of a prevailing

(a) The rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any
and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity; but no person
permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of this chapter
shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or more actions, a total
amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the act complained of....
The problem created by this section is discussed at notes 64-80 infra and accompanying
text.
5. Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 540 (1962) (noting the "well-established rule that
counsel fees may not be recovered as compensatory damages"); Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R., 186 F.2d 473, 481 (4th Cir. 1951) ("fojrdinarily, of course, attorneys' fees, except as
fixed by statute, should not be taxed as a part of the costs recovered by the prevailing
party").
Section 28(a) limits recovery to actual damages, or what courts refer to as compensatory
damages. Because attorneys' fees are generally not included in a compensatory damages
award, itis argued that they are not actual damages and therefore are precluded by § 28(a).
See notes 64-80 infra and accompanying text.
6. Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 535 F.2d 982, 996 (7th Cir. 1976)(the court found intentional, wanton conduct in a securities transaction which otherwise constituted bad faith
within the exception; however, the court refused to award fees because the circumstances
were not an exceptional situation); Kirsch Co. v. Bliss & Laughlin Indus., Inc. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,993 (W.D. Mich. 1981) (the court found intentional and fraudulent violation of securities law reporting provisions which fell within the
bad faith exception, but refused to award fees because the circumstances were not exceptional); Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 838, 849 (E.D. Va. 1968)(the court
found a violation of securities laws amounting to fraud and gross misconduct otherwise
within the bad faith exception; however, the court said the violation did not rise to a level of
vexatious conduct). See notes 83-90 infra and accompanying text. See also note 13 infra
which shows that these courts applied the rule as it existed in the early stages of
development.
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litigant unless specifically authorized by statute7 or unless the parties to a suit contractually agree to shift fees.8 The United States
Supreme Court first articulated the rule in Arcambel v. Wiseman.9
Although the Court has recognized that this principle is not completely satisfactory, it has unequivocally reaffirmed its holding.10
The Court has given two grounds for its adherence to this rule.
First, the Court believes that it would be unfair to penalize honest
litigants merely for bringing a claim or offering a defense.1 Second, in the Court's opinion, holding a party liable for the prevailing litigant's legal fees would unjustly deter the poor from vindicating their rights."2
Notwithstanding the Court's general reluctance to award fees, it

7. Congress has authorized attorney fee awards in statutes protecting federal rights.
Packers and Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. § 210(0 (1976); Perishable Agricultural Commodities
Act, 7 U.S.C. § 499g(b) (1975); Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 104(a)(1), 641-644 (1976);
Clayton Act 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976); Unfair Competition Act, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1976); Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(3) (1976); Trust Indenture Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77www(a) (1976);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a) (1976); Truth in Lending Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1976); Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, Title IV, 15
U.S.C. § 1989(a)(2) (1976); Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976);
Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976); Norris-LaGuardia Act 29 U.S.C. §
107(e) (1976); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976); Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 928 (1976); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1976); Maine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of
1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(a)(4) (1976); Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d)
(1976); Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976); Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b) and 2000e-5(k) (1976); Fair Housing Act of 1968
42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976); Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4911(d) (1976); Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 153(p) (1976); Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 46 U.S.C. § 1227 (1976);
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 206 (1976); Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§
8, 16(2) (1976); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a) and (c).
8. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975); Hall v. Cole,
412 U.S. 1, 4 (1973); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717
(1967); Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796).
9. 3. U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).
10. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y 421 U.S. 240, 250 (1975); Fleischmann
Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717-18 (1967); Havenstein v. Lynham,
100 U.S. 483, 491 (1880); Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187, 197 (1879); Oelrichs v. Spain,
82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211, 223-24 (1872); Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 372-73
(1852).
Within the past 60 years, legal commentators have expressed dissatisfaction with the
United States' adherence to the rule. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 1; Goodhart, supra note 1;
Kuenzel, supra note 1; Stoebuck, supra note 1.
11. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967). See,
e.g., Comment, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA.
L. REV. 636, 644 (1974).
12. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967). Cf.
Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 235 (1964).
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has recognized exceptions which are grounded in the Court's inherent equity power, applied in its discretion."3 The two viable exceptions' 4 are the common fund/benefit exception 5 and the bad faith
exception.' 6
The Common Fund/Benefit Exception
Under the common fund/benefit exception a court may award
attorneys' fees to a litigant who has created or protected a fund or
benefit which affects a class of potential plaintiffs. 7 The purpose
of the exception is to prevent unjust enrichment to a class or corporation receiving the benefit of litigation without contributing to
the costs. 8 The award is premised on the positive benefit conferred by the plaintiff to an ascertainable class. 1"

13. Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 F.2d 473, 481 (4th Cir. 1951) ("[In a suit in
equity where the taxation of such costs is essential to the doing of justice, they may be
allowed in exceptional cases"). See also Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l -Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166
(1939)("plainly, the foundation for the historic practice of granting reimbursement for the
costs of litigation other than the conventional taxable costs is part of the original authority
of the chancellor to do equity in a particular situation"); Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City
S. Ry., 28 F.2d 233, 241 (8th Cir. 1928), rev'd on other grounds, 281 U.S. 1 (1930)("The
United States courts of equity at the time of their creation became endowed with the powers, including that over costs, possessed by the English Chancery Court").
14. A third exception, the private attorney general exception, awarded fees to a successful litigant who enforced statutes embodying public rights. In Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), the Supreme Court eliminated the exception, holding
that absent specific statutory authority, attorneys' fees could not be awarded in federal litigation under the private attorney general exception. Id. at 263.
For pre-Alyeska discussions of the private attorney general exception see Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 301 (1973); Note, Awarding
Attorneys' Fees to the "PrivateAttorney General": JudicialGreen Light to Private Litigation in the Public Interest, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 733 (1973).
15. See notes 17-22 infra and accompanying text.
16. See notes 23-35 infra and accompanying text.
17. The Supreme Court first used the exception in Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527
(1882), a suit involving a creditor of a trust. The Court held that when a litigant salvages
assets (i.e., creates, increases or protects a fund) for the benefit of a class of which he is a
member, the fund may be charged with all necessary expenses incurred in achieving the
result. Id. at 530.
18. In Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973) the Supreme Court rationalized that "to allow the
others to obtain full benefit from the plaintiff's efforts without contributing equally to the
litigation expenses would be to enrich the others unjustly at the plaintiff's expense." Id. at
5-6. See Note, Recovery of Attorneys' Fees: Exceptions to the American Rule, 25 DRAKE L.
REv. 717, 729 (1976); Note, Rule 10b-5, supra note 1 at 326; Comment, Exceptions to the
Rule, supra note 1 at 573.
19. F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 128-30
(1974) ("[wie have long recognized that attorneys' fees may be awarded . . . where a successful litigant has conferred a substantial benefit on a class of persons and the court's shifting of fees operates to spread the cost proportionately among the members of the benefited
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This exception, when used in securities litigation, is generally

applied in class actions and derivative suits.20 The rationale for
awarding fees is based on equitable principles. Because class or
corporate representatives, by bringing a successful action, have
conferred a benefit upon all the members of a class or corporation,
they should in fairness be relieved of the financial burden incurred."1 Recent court decisions indicate courts are willing to
award fees to a prevailing plaintiff who confers a substantial benefit even absent his protection of a monetary fund from which fees
could be paid.'2
The Bad Faith Exception

The bad faith exception allows a court to award attorneys' fees
to a successful litigant when his opponent acted in a vexatious or
wanton manner or for oppressive reasons. 2' Because fees may be
awarded to a prevailing defendant as well as to a prevailing plaintiff, the exception may also deter frivolous litigation and prevent
injustice to innocent litigants. 4 Courts have viewed the awarding
class"); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 533-34 (1882)("[Hlaving come in and proved,
and obtained the benefit of the suit which was instituted on their behalf, as well as that of
the plaintiff, it cannot be just that in such a suit . . .one alone should bear the burden,
when others have the benefit"). See note 18 supra.
20. 2 FED. RULES DIGEST § 23a.16 (3rd ed. 1975); 3B J. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE,
23.91, 23.1.25 (2d ed. 1980); 9a C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
§§ 1803, 1841 (1973); 3 H. NEWBERO, CLASS ACTIONS, ch. 13 (1977); Note, Computing Attorney's Fees in Class Actions: Recent Judicial Guidelines, 16 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 630
(1975), Comment, Attorneys' Fees in ShareholderDerivative Suits: The Substantial Benefit Rule Re-examined, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 164 (1972).
21. See notes 19 and 20 supra.
22. See notes 57-62 infra and accompanying text.
23. Courts following the vexatious, wanton doctrine include, Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co.
v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975); F. D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel.
Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973); Newman
v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.4 (1968). See, e.g., Vaughan v. Atkinson,
369 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962)(defendant's callous attitude forcing plaintiff to go to court to
obtain what was plainly his); Bradley v. School Bd., 345 F.2d 310, 321 (4th Cir.), vacated,
382 U.S. 103 (1965)(fees are appropriate only when it is found that bringing the action was
unnecessary and compelled by the school board's unreasonable, obdurate obstinacy); Bell v.
School Bd., 321 F.2d 494, 500 (4th Cir. 1963)(unyielding refusal to take initiative, interposing administrative obstacles to thwart the plaintiffs' wishes for desegregation); Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 F.2d 473, 481 (4th Cir. 1951)(plaintiffs of small means subjected
to discriminatory and oppressive conduct by a powerful labor organization).
24. Embodied in the purposes of the equity power of courts is deterrence of frivolous
litigation and prevention of injustice to innocent litigants. These purposes, being those of
the English Chancery Court, were given to the American courts of equity in the Judiciary
Act of 1789. The purposes are now reflected in the bad faith exception. Note, Attorneys'
Fees and the Federal Bad Faith Exception, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 319, 324 (1977); Comment,
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of bad faith fees as both a form of punitive2 5 and compensatory 6
damages.
The exception employs a standard based on a litigant's conduct
itself and the time that the conduct occurred, in order to determine whether fees are justified. A litigant who either obstinately
refuses to recognize or intentionally evades a clear legal duty exhibits sufficient bad faith to allow an award of fees. A court may
justify an award of fees when bad faith occurs either during the
litigation and affects the litigation process, or when bad faith occurs prior to the litigation and induces the plaintiff to bring the
cause of action.
Courts have awarded bad faith fees for several types of bad faith
conduct occurring during non-securities litigation. For example,
awards have been made in favor of a defendant where the plaintiff
filed a groundless suit, 28 and in favor of a plaintiff where the defen-

dant asserted a baseless defense. 2 ' In addition, fees have been

Exceptions to the Rule, supra note 1 at 573. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1333 (1st Cir. 1973).
25. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973). Most courts citing Hall fail to recognize that the
case was decided under the common fund/benefit exception, and that the Court's statements regarding the punitive nature of bad faith fees are dicta. The statements, therefore,
should not carry the weight of authority that has been attributed to them.
26. In Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S. Ry., 28 F.2d 233, 240 (8th Cir. 1928), rev'd
on other grounds, 281 U.S. 1 (1930), one of the early cases recognizing the bad faith exception, the Eighth Circuit found that the court's equity power to award fees was the same as
that of the English Chancery Court's. Id. at 241. See note 24 supra. Professor McCormick
commenting on this decision said that "[It] may be the benchmark of a new and salutory
doctrine in the federal courts that in equity the chancellor. . . may in his discretion award
counsel fees and expenses as costs against the losing party ....
" McCormick, Counsel Fees
and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Damages, 15 MINN. L. REv. 619, 625-26
(1931). The "benchmark" noted by Professor McCormick was recognized by the Supreme
Court in Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939). See note 13 supra. More recently the court in In re National Student Mktg. Litig., 78 F.R.D. 726, 728 n.3 (D.D.C. 1978)
stated that bad faith fee awards are "compensatory, through recovery by an injured party of
expenses incurred due to the other party's harassing and vexatious litigation tactics [citations omitted]." See also Wright v. Jackson, 522 F.2d 955, 958 (4th Cir. 1975). But see note
5 supra; Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973)(bad faith fees are essentially punitive damages).
27. See notes 29-33 infra and accompanying text.
28. Gazan v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 6 F. Supp. 568, 568 (E.D.N.Y. 1934)(plaintiffs charged
with fees for instituting a baseless stockholder action).
29. See, e.g., Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1088
(2nd Cir. 1977)(the defense must be wholly without color); Gates v. Collier, 70 F.R.D. 341,
343 (N.D. Miss. 1976)(defendants' refusal to admit culpability and stipulate facts in the face
of evidence indicating defendants' clear liability, which was brought out at evidentiary hearings, forced the plaintiff to engage in extensive discovery not otherwise required); Baas v.
Elliot, 71 F.R.D. 693, 694 (E.D.N.Y. 1976)(defendant's reversal of position mid-litigation
was a frivolous, self-defeating invocation of federal procedure).
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charged against parties offering unnecessary motions and using
pleadings to disrupt the litigation process.8 0 Each of these situations, of course, involved more than a mere finding of facts against
a party.3 1 The courts in these cases found an obstinate refusal to
recognize an indisputable legal right or an intentional evasion of a
clear legal duty. 3
Bad faith fees may also be awarded for conduct occurring prior

to commencement of the litigation. Specifically, courts have shifted
fees where a defendant obstinately refused to recognize his duty
under well established law, 83 where a defendant exhibited a long

30. Lipsig v. National Student Mktg. [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 1
97,713 (D.C. Cir. 1980)(attorney's misquotes and material omission in documentary evidence
required substantial responsive pleading); First Nat'l Bank v. Dunham, 471 F.2d 712, 713
(8th Cir. 1973)(defendant attempted to bribe a handwriting expert and falsify records for
trial).
31. In Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 182-86 (1976) the Supreme Court used a standard of "mere findings of fact against a party" as a standard for determining whether or not
to award bad faith fees for conduct during the litigation. In the case, which involved alleged
racial discrimination in a private school, the plaintiffs asserted that the sole purpose of the
defendant's denial of the allegations was to prolong the litigation and was in bad faith. The
Court reasoned that in any case in which facts are disputed a court must decide that one
version is inaccurate. It would be untenable to conclude from such a denial that a litigant
acted in bad faith.
The Supreme Court's pronouncement that a mere finding of facts against a party is insufficient to justify fees under the bad faith exception, is as far as the Court has come in
stating a standard for determining bad faith. Earlier cases refer only to interests of justice
as the applicable standard. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 262
(1975); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 6 (1973); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 167
(1930).
Lower federal courts applying the bad faith exception allude to the stringent standards
for applying the bad faith exception. The courts, however, never define the stringent standard and it is unclear whether they are applying interests of justice as a standard or a new
standard. For example, in Bond v. Stanton, 528 F.2d 688 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 426 U.S.
905, vacated, 429 U.S. 973 (1976), on remand, 555 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438
U.S. 916 (1978), the plaintiff sued state officials for noncompliance with the Social Security
Act. Throughout the litigation the defendant "continually asserted compliance with the
HEW requirements in the face of documentary evidence to the contrary." Id. at 690. The
court stated that the evidence amply supported a finding of bad faith and that "stringent as
the standards for establishing bad faith may be . . . they were more than satisfied by the
facts before [it]." Id.
32. See notes 28-31 supra.
33. In Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962) a sailor underwent medical treatment.
He requested reimbursement for maintenance and medical expenses under the admiralty
laws. The owner of the vessel on which he served refused the claim. The Supreme Court
reversed the circuit court's denial of attorneys' fees. The Court said that "maintenance and
cure is designed to provide a seaman with food and lodging when he becomes sick . . . in
the ship's service; and it extends during the period when he is incapacitated to do a seaman's work and continues until he reaches maximum medical recovery." Id. at 531. The
Court awarded fees as damages due to the obstinate refusal of the shipowner to pay sums
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standing pattern of evasion and obstruction of Supreme Court
mandates, 4 and where a defendant forced a plaintiff to institute
suit regarding an issue decided against the same defendant in a
previous case.3 5
AVAILABILITY OF ATTORNEYS' FEES IN IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHTS OF
ACTION

Implied Private Rights of Action under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934
Although various sections of the 1934 Act either require or proclearly owed under laws centuries old.
34. In Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963) a desegregation case decided after
Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955), the Fourth Circuit awarded fees under the
bad faith exception. In Bell the parents of school children attending county schools sued to
force desegregation. The court characterized the school district's conduct as follows:
[D]efendants' unyielding refusal to take any initiative . . . [interposed] a variety
of administrative obstacles to thwart the valid wishes of the plaintiffs for a desegregated education. To put it plainly, such tactics would in any other context be
instantly recognized as discreditable. The equitable remedy would be far from
complete, and justice would not be attained, if reasonable counsel fees were not
awarded in a case so extreme.
Id. at 500.
See also Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 606 (5th Cir. 1974)(feeshifting justified where
plaintiff proves violation of clearly established law); Rolfe v. County Bd. of Educ., 391 F.2d
77, 81 (6th Cir. 1968)(a long, continuing pattern of evasion and obstruction of the desegregation of schools justified fee shifting); Hill v. Franklin County Bd. of Educ., 390 F.2d 583, 585
(6th Cir. 1968)(feeshifting allowed where the board of education continued their announced
policy of adamant obstinacy); Clark v. Board of Educ., 369 F.2d 661, 671 (8th Cir. 1966)(defendant's obstinate, adamant and open resistance to the law caused costly litigation to vindicate constitutionally guaranteed and protected rights, which were collectively and individually violated); Bradley v. School Bd., 53 F.R.D. 28, 40-41 (E.D. Va. 1971)(defendant's delay
and inaction caused needless litigation in a community conditioned to a false hope that
constitutional interpretations enunciated by courts would be effectuated).
35. In McEnteggart v. Cataldo, 451 F.2d 1109 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 943
(1972), the plaintiff's employer, a state college, refused to renew his teaching contract.
McEnteggart requested an explanation, which the trustees of the college refused to give.
Plaintiff sued for reinstatement. The First Circuit, despite finding that the school had sufficient grounds for the dismissal, awarded fees to plaintiff. Not only did the school violate the
plaintiff's constitutional right to due process by refusing to give a reason for dismissal, but
the school had previously lost a similar case. Because the previous litigation had decided the
exact issue the school was defending, the court thought it outrageous that the defendant
had repeated its action. Id. at 1112. Cf. Stolberg v. Board of Trustees, 474 F.2d 485, 491 (2d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 897 (1976), citing Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852, 853 (1st
Cir. 1972)(fees awarded where the plaintiff's constitutional rights were clear at the time of
the defendant's conduct as well as at the time of the suit. The defendant's refusal to recognize these rights caused a long, unnecessary course of vindication). Cf. King v. Caesar Rodney School Dist., 396 F. Supp. 423, 428 (D. Del. 1975)(fees denied where the school board's
violation of plaintiff's right to due process was only out of a misguided intention to inquire
fully into the facts before taking action).
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hibit certain conduct, several of these sections do not expressly

state that any person may be liable to another for violations of
these provisions." As a result, it is unclear on the face of the statute whether an individual damaged by a violation of these provisions has standing to sue.
Recognizing the necessity for private enforcement of these statutes, the Supreme Court in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak8 7 implied a private right of action under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. The Court stated that the underlying policy for allowing the private right of action is to provide remedies effectuating the congressional purpose underlying the 1934 Act. That purpose is protection of the national public interest through
regulation and control of the securities exchanges," explicitly
stated in section 2 of the 1934 Act. 8 ' Using this purpose as a basis
for its decision, the Supreme Court stated that where a federal
statute gives a general right to sue and where legal rights have
been invaded, the federal courts may use any available remedy to
40
correct the harm done.

The Court's rationale has been used to imply a private right of

4
'4
4
action for damages under sections 10(b), 1 14(a), and 13(d), 3 of

36. Securities Exchange Act [hereinafter cited as "SEA"] § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1976); SEA § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976); SEA § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976) are
examples of sections which do not specifically allow a private individual to maintain a cause
of action. See notes 41-43 supra. Breach of these rules may result in criminal penalties, 15
U.S.C. § 78dd(a) (1976); court injunction, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1976) and in some cases administrative sanctions taken against broker-dealers, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(5) (1976); taken
against other persons, 15 U.S.C.
78o(b)(7) (1976).
37. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
38. Id. at 433. Recently, in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11
(1979), the Court denied a private damage remedy in a suit based on § 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976). This may indicate a trend in restricting the expansion of implied private actions.
39. SEA § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1976) states that the purpose of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 is "to impose requirements necessary to make ... regulation and control reasonably complete and effective, in order to protect interstate commerce, the national credit
...
and to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets in [securities] ...
transactions."
40. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange ...
(b) To use or employ in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
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the 1934 Act. Section 10(b) makes it unlawful to use in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security any manipulative device
or contrivance in contravention of rules prescribed by the Securities Exchange Commission.44 Rule 10b-5, promulgated under section 10(b), specifically prohibits the use of any manipulative device
to defraud, and the use of untrue statements or misstatements of
material facts.'5 Ordinarily, an individual plaintiff unable to meet
the requirements for a derivative suit or class action under section
10(b) may bring suit in his own behalf. 4" Generally, courts limit
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities
exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any
proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to section 781 of this title.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976) states that:
Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the beneficial ownership of any equity security of a class which is registered pursuant to section 781 of this title, or any equity
security of an insurance company which would have been required to be so registered except
for the exemption contained in section 78(g)(2)(G) of this title or any equity security issued
by a closed-end investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940;
is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 5 per centum of such class shall,
within ten days after such acquisition, send to the issuer of the security at its principal
executive office, by registered or certified mall, send to each exchange where the security is
traded, and file with the Commission, a statement containing such of the following information, and such additional information, as the Commission may by rules and regulations prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors
44.
45.

See note 41 supra.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
46. An individual plaintiff bringing suit under the securities laws must still meet the
standing requirements of the 1934 Act. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 732, reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975) (standing to bring a private damage action under
SEC rule 10b-5 is limited to actual "purchasers" or "sellers" of securities); Superintendent
of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13-14 (1971), (citing Shell v. Hensley, 430
F.2d 819, 827 (5th Cir. 1970)) ("When a person who is dealing with a corporation in a securi-
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recovery to actual damages.47
ties transaction denies the corporation's directors access to material information known to
him, the corporation is disabled from availing itself of an informed judgment on the part of
its board. . . . In this situation the private right of action recognized under Rule lob-5 is
available as a remedy .... ");Jordan Bldg. Corp. v. Doyle, O'Connor & Co., 401 F.2d 47, 50
(7th Cir. 1968) ("a private right of action exists under § 10(b) whether plaintiff is a buyer or
a seller"); cf. Ohaski v. Verit Indus., 536 F.2d 849, 852 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1004
(1976)(plaintiff must allege that his purchase or sale was the result of the defendant's fraudulent activities); G & M, Inc. v. Newbern, 488 F.2d 742, 745 (9th Cir. 1973)(a plaintiff may
sue a person not a party to a sale where that person made misrepresentations on which
plaintiff relied); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 803 (5th Cir. 1970)(plaintiffs who fail to
claim that they or members of their class purchased or sold securities in connection with the
alleged manipulation do not have standing to sue); Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 342
F.2d 596, 604 (7th Cir.), rev'd, 383 U.S. 363, reh'g denied, 384 U.S. 915 (1965)(any cause of
action under § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 is a right of the person injured); Lorber v.
Beebe, 407 F. Supp. 279, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)(in order to sue under § 11 of the Securities
Act of 1933 the plaintiff must prove that the stock he purchased was issued pursuant to a
false registration statement); Osadchy v. Gans, 436 F. Supp. 677, 685 (D.N.J. 1977)("Federal
securities law protects individuals damaged through the sale or purchase of securities when
the sale was made in reasonable reliance on the misrepresentaions of defendants").
47. The amount of recovery is usually determined under the out-of-pocket rule. For
cases demonstrating the out-of-pocket rule, see Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220,
224-25 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976)(the measure of damages in a §
10(b) and rule 10b-5 action is the out-of-pocket rule borrowed from the tort action of deceit); Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 416 (3d Cir.), on remand, 390 F. Supp.
470 (W.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd in part, 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir.), cause remanded in part, 527 F.2d
891- (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1975)(a defrauded purchaser of securities in a
§ 10(b), rule lob-5 action may recover the greater of the sale price of stock in the fraudulent
transaction less its fair market value at that time, or the amount of buyer's profit on resale);
Fershtman v. Schectman, 450 F.2d 1357, 1361 (2d Cir. 1971)("a buyer defrauded in violation
of the securities laws is 'entitled to recover only the excess of what he paid over the value of
what he got' . . . "); Ingenito v. Bermec Corp., 441 F. Supp. 525, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)("A
buyer's recovery for a fraudulent securities transaction is limited to . . .the excess of what
he paid over what he got"); Beecher v. Able, 435 F. Supp. 397, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)(damages
for violation of rule 10b-5 are measured by looking at value received at time of purchase);
Hickman v. Groesbeck, 389 F. Supp. 769, 779 (D. Utah 1974)(actual damages are measured
by the out-of-pocket rule for rule lOb-5 securities actions); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton,
326 F. Supp. 250, 262 (D. Md. 1971), supplemented, 343 F. Supp. 245 (D. Md. 1972), affd
in part and rev'd in part, 488 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916
(1974)(damages recovery in a § 10(b) action is measured by plaintiff's out-of-pocket loss);
Chaney v. Western States Title Ins. Co., 292 F. Supp. 376, 377 (D. Utah 1968)(federal courts
determining damages under the Securities Exchange Act generally follow the out-of-pocket
rule); Baumel v. Rosen, 283 F. Supp. 128, 147 (D. Md. 1968), af'd in part and rev'd in part,
412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970)(general rule of recovery in a
§ 10(b) action is the difference between value on date of return and highest value which
plaintiffs were deprived of ownership, with interest). However, consequential damages have
been awarded. Foster v. Financial Technology Inc., 517 F.2d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 1975)(consequential damages are recoverable in a rule 10b-5 action where plaintiff can prove with
reasonable certainty that the damages were the result of the defendant's violation); Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 238 (7th Cir. 1974)(where plaintiff can establish a
causal connection between fraud and expenses, consequential damages may be recovered).
See notes 64-70 infra and accompanying text.
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Section 14(a) makes it unlawful for any person to solicit proxies
in violation of rules and regulations established by the Securities
Exchange Commission. As in section 10(b), courts imply a private
right of action, allowing individuals to bring suit under that section.48 Ordinarily, the individual plaintiff recovers only actual
damages.4 9
Finally, section 13(d) of the 1934 Act requires the owner of five
percent or more of any class of a corporation's registered securities
to file certain information with the Securities Exchange Commission within ten days after acquiring the five percent share. The
purpose of this section is to provide full disclosure of corporate
equity ownership when a person seeks to acquire a substantial
block of equity securities. 50 The intended beneficiaries of the section are the private investors of the corporation. 1 Nevertheless,
only a few courts allow a private right of action."' Under this section, where a private right of action is implied, courts have limited
58
recovery to injunctive relief.

48. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964); LeLandais & Co., v. MDS-Atron,
Inc., 543 F.2d 421, 422 (2d Cir. 1975) cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977); Sargent v. Genesco,
Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 754 (5th Cir. 1974).
49. Many § 14(a) cases, however, involve derivative suits requesting injunctions to prevent corporate action. In these cases damages are not an appropriate remedy, and injunctive
relief is granted. See, e.g., Bastian v. Lakefront Realty Corp., 581 F.2d 685 (7th Cir. 1978);
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Independent Stockholders Comm., 354 F. Supp. 895 (D. Del.
1973); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Lewis, 334 F. Supp. 1398 (D.C.N.Y. 1971).
Where an individual plaintiff can prove, however, that he relied to his detriment on the
proxy and incurred monetary loss, courts award damages. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
50. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 712 (2nd Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910
(1972); Berman v. Metzger [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,857 (D.D.C.
1981). See Note, Private Rights of Action for Damages Under Section 13(d), 32 STAN. L.
REv. 581.
51. Berman v. Metzger [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,857 (D.D.C.
1981); S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. 2-3 (1967), H.R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong. 2d
Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws, 2811, 2812-13.
52. Courts have allowed a private right of action under § 13(d) in Dan River, Inc. v.
Unitex Ltd., 624 F.2d 1216 (4th Cir. 1980); General Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert, 556 F.2d 90
(1st Cir. 1977); Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. 294 (D. Del. 1981); Kirsch Co. v.
Bliss & Laughlin Indus., Inc. 495 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
53. The following cases limited recovery in a § 13(d) action to injunctive relief: Rondeau
v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975); Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex Ltd., 624 F.2d 1216
(4th Cir. 1980); General Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert, 556 F.2d 90 (1st Cir. 1977); Bath Indus.,
Inc., v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970); Standard Metals Corp. v. Tomlin, [1981 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,894 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); e.g., Treadway Co. v. Care Corp.,
490 F. Supp. 660, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)(the court denied relief but recognized that under
different circumstances, i.e., a buyer-seller relying on the false information, the plaintiff
could recover attorneys' fees).
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Attorneys' Fees for Bad Faith Conduct in Implied Private
Rights of Action under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.," the Supreme Court dis:
cussed the availability of attorneys' fees under the exceptions to
the American rule. The decision is important because of the
Court's statements regarding recovery of attorneys' fees in implied
actions under the 1934 Act.
In Mills the plaintiffs filed a derivative suit under section
14(a)." s They alleged that the corporation's management used false
proxy statements to obtain approval of a corporate merger. The
Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court for a determination of proper relief but granted an interim award of fees
under the common fund exception. The Court held that provisions
in the 1934 Act specifically allowing attorneys' fees should not be
read as a denial of the courts' power to award fees under other
sections of the 1934 Act.58 The Court supported this conclusion by
drawing an analogy between its power to award fees and its power
to create an implied right of action. 7 Recognizing that its inherent
power to imply a private right of action was not limited by the
express statutory provisions granting private enforcement, the
Court reasoned that its inherent power to award attorneys' fees
should similarly not be limited by the express statutory provisions

54. 396 U.S. 375 (1970). See generally Comment, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.: Proxy
Violations-The Causation Question and the Award of Attorney's Fees, 65 Nw. U.L. Rv.
854 (1970); Comment, The Changing American Rule Against Attorney Fee Shifting: Mills
v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. and Hall v. Cole, 28 Sw. L.J. 542 (1974); Comment, The Allocation
of Attorney's Fees After Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 38 U. CHi. L. REv. 316 (1971).
55. The plaintiffs in Mills desired to set aside a corporate merger which the shareholders
approved based on false proxy statements. The Court found the statements materially misleading and in violation of SEA § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) and rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-9, because minority shareholder approval was required to acquire the two-thirds
majority needed to pass the merger. The proxies stated Auto-Lite's board's approval but
failed to state that the merging corporation owned 50% of Auto-Lite common stock and
that Auto-Lite's directors were controlled by the merging corporation.
56. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 390 (1970) (citing Smolowe v. Delendo,
136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1943)). The Second Circuit determined that congressional silence
did not evidence intent to deny courts the power to award fees under sections of the 1934
Act which do not mention fees. The sections which specifically provide for attorneys' fees
"merely enforce an additional penalty against the wrongdoer." Id.
57. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 390-91 (1970) analogizes between a
court's power to imply private actions and award attorneys' fees. The Court stated that "the
specific provisions [of the 1934 Act, allowing attorneys' fees] should not be read as denying
to the courts the power to award counsel fees in suits under other sections of the Act...
any more than the express creation by those sections of private liabilities negates the possibility of an implied right of action under § 14(a)." Id.
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awarding attorneys' fees. This holding is consistent with earlier
cases in which the Court implied a private right of action, because
ability to imply both a private right of action and to award attorneys' fees serves the remedial purposes of the 1934 Act."
Moreover, the Mills decision demonstrated an even more liberal
approach to attorneys' fees than had previously existed under the
common law. Under the common benefit exception, if the representative party conferred a benefit on a class of persons, each
member of this class would pay a proportion of the attorneys'
fees." The Court applied a combined common fund/benefit exception, and extended this exception beyond its common law application. The Court held that plaintiffs' showing that they had conferred a substantial benefit on a corporation brought the case
within the exception, requiring the defendant corporation to pay
the fees.
The Mills decision, expanding the common fund/benefit exception, indicates the Supreme Court's liberal attitude toward attorneys' fees. Hall v. Cole,60 decided three years after Mills, is consistent with this liberal attitude. In Hall, plaintiffs brought suit
pursuant to an express statutory cause of action under the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act. The Supreme Court
awarded fees to the plaintiffs under the expanded common fund/
benefit rationale recognized in Mills. In addition, the Court discussed the propriety of awarding fees for bad faith conduct. Because the evidence failed to show any bad faith conduct however,
the Court refused to award bad faith attorneys' fees. Nevertheless,
the Court recognized that even under an explicit statutory scheme,
courts have the power to award fees under the bad faith exception,
when overriding considerations such as furthering congressional
purpose indicate a need to do so.61

The overriding considerations referred to in Hall are most often
present in implied actions under the 1934 Act.6" Absent awards of
58. See notes 36-43 supra and accompanying text.
59. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
60. 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
61. Id. at 5 (citing Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391-92 (1970)).
62. Overriding considerations as a basis for awarding fees has never been specifically
defined by the courts using the term. The phrase, used interchangeably with "exceptional
situation" and "specific circumstances," is based on a subjective determination by the court
that the facts of the case justify awarding attorneys' fees. In the context of the bad faith
exception it is a determination that a litigant's conduct has reached an indefinite level sufficient to award fees.
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attorneys' fees for bad faith conduct, the remedial purposes of the
1934 Act would not be achieved. This is due to the tremendous
expense imposed on a private litigant bringing an implied action,
which is aggravated by the opponent's bad faith. Often, the plaintiff's attorneys' fees exceed the court's award of damages. 3s Thus,
refusing to award attorneys' fees under the exception would encourage a defendant to indulge in bad faith conduct because a
plaintiff would be deterred from filing suit by the disproportionate
costs of the litigation.
The Mills and Hall decisions indicate the Court's willingness to
provide a solution to the problem faced by the plaintiff unable to
afford the cost of litigating his rights. Allowing bad faith fees
where a potential defendant has exhibited bad faith conduct encourages the prospective plaintiff to pursue his rights, because he
can recover his costs if circumstances bring his suit within the exception. It also discourages potential defendants from pursuing a
course of wilful and wanton conduct by providing injured investors
with effective redress for costs incurred as the result of such conduct. Thus, by awarding fees under the bad faith exception, the
remedial purposes of the 1934 Act are effectuated and congressional intent is served.
Section 28(a) as a Bar to Bad Faith Attorneys' Fees
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's apparent willingness to
award bad faith attorneys' fees, lower courts have denied fees, relying on section 28(a) of the 1934 Act which limits recovery under
the Act to actual damages.6 In Straub v. Vaisman & Co.,1 5 the
Third Circuit denied fees, basing its decision on section 28(a), the
Mills decision, and the more recent Supreme Court decision in
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.61
In Straub, the plaintiffs brought an implied private action under
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, where they had purchased stock
based on fraudulent recommendations of the defendant. The dis-

63. As an example, in Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976), the damage
award totalled $38,875.00 and the attorneys' fees amounted to $47,808.42. Id. at 594-95. See,
e.g., Note, Attorney's Fees as an Element of Costs: The Copyright Experience, 4 GA. L.
REv. 571, 588 (1970).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976). See note 4 supra.
65. 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976).
66. 425 U.S. 185, 185 (1975), reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976) (a private cause of action
will not lie under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 absent an allegation of "scienter," i.e., intent to
deceive, manipulate or defraud).
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trict court, finding that the defendant's conduct was wilful, wanton
and reprehensible, awarded attorneys' fees under the bad faith exception. 7 The Third Circuit reversed the award of fees, holding
that section 28(a) barred bad faith fees based on conduct occurring
prior to the litigation. As previously discussed, courts generally
construe section 28(a) as limiting recovery for securities law violations to actual damages. s8 Therefore, the circuit court reasoned,
punitive damages as well may not be awarded under section
28(a).' 9 The Straub court reasoned that bad faith attorneys' fees
for conduct occurring prior to the litigation are essentially punitive
damages70 and, therefore, bad faith attorneys' fees were barred by
the section.
In reversing the fee award, the Straub court used flawed reasoning. Bad faith attorneys' fees are not punitive damages. The purpose of awarding such fees is to fully compensate the plaintiff for
being forced to litigate a well established right.7 1 Thus, awarding
fees for an opponent's bad faith conduct does not amount to
awarding punitive damages and does not violate section 28(a) of
67. Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 594-95 (3d Cir. 1976). The defendant securities dealer gave advice concerning stock purchases to foreign investors. The plaintiff investors relied on false statements to purchase stock which defendant knew was a poor investment. The court found that given the defendants' position of trust in the handling of
discretionary securities accounts its breach was reprehensible.
68. See note 4 supra.
69. Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 596 (1976).
70. Id., citing Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1975). See also Ryan v. Foster & Marshall, Inc.,
556 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir. 1977); Byrnes v. Faulkner, Dawkins & Sullivan, 550 F.2d 1303,
1313 (2d Cir. 1977); Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1283 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 302-03 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969). Contra, deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 302 F. Supp.
647, 649 (D. Colo. 1969); DeNeane v. McDonnel & Co., [1969 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 92,462 (D.D.C. 1969); Baumel v. Rosen, 283 F. Supp. 128, 145 (D. Md. 1968),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037
(1970); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 445 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
For a discussion of the availability of punitive damages in securities litigations, see Hirsch
& Lewis, Punitive Damage Awards Under the Federal Securities Acts, 47 NoTRE DAME
LAw. 72 (1971); Note, Punitive Damages in Implied Private Actions for Fraud Under the
Securities Laws, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 646 (1970); Note, Punitive Damages for Securities
Regulation, 8 Hous. L. REv. 137 (1970); Note, The Availability of Punitive Damages for
Express and Implied Causes of Action Under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 43 TEMPLE L.Q. 140 (1970); Note, The Reappearance of Punitive
Damages in Private Actions for Securities Fraud, 5 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 111 (1971); Note,
Punitive Damages in Implied Civil Actions Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Need
for Flexibility, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1280 (1970).
71. See Richey, Attorney's Fees: A Two Pronged Problem, 11 TRiAL 59 (1975); and note
26 supra.
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the 1934 Act. 2
The Straub court supported its holding by relying on Mills and
Hochfelder. The court cited Mills for the principle that counsel

fees cannot be awarded as an item of damages unless specifically
authorized under a statute.7 8 It cited a Hochfelder footnote as authority for the proposition that a court's power to award fees under
'7
section 10(b) is "sharply circumscribed." '
The Straub court's interpretation of both cases is questionable.
First, the statement attributed to Mills is contrary to the Supreme
Court's statements regarding attorneys' fees.7 5 In additon, the
Mills court, through its analogy between the power of the court to

imply actions and to award attorneys' fees, has advocated a broad
application of the exceptions to the American rule.7 6 Further, the
expansion of the common fund/benefit exception to award fees to
accomplish justice, as demonstrated in Mills, argues in favor of the
availability of bad faith attorneys' fees.
Second, the court erred in relying on the Hochfelder footnote.
Hochfelder involved a determination of the elements of liability in
a section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 action, not the availability of fees."

72. The dissenting judge in Straub also reached the conclusion that awarding bad faith
attorneys' fees does not amount to awarding punitive damages. Ignoring § 28(a), the judge
relied on the statement in Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1975) that bad faith fees may be
awarded for "actions that led to the lawsuit." Id. at 15. The dissent argued that the defendant's fraud was wanton, wilful and reprehensible, and stated that an award of fees would
be in conformity with the equitable nature of the proceedings. Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540
F.2d 591, 601 (3d Cir. 1976).
73. Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 599 (3d Cir. 1976) (citing Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970)).
74. Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 599 (3d Cir. 1976) (citing Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1975)). The footnote states in part:
One of [the] purposes [of amending § 11(e) to include attorneys' fees recovery]
was to deter actions brought solely for their potential settlement value. . . .[citations omitted]. This deterrent is lacking in the § 10b context, in which a district
court's power to award attorneys' fees is sharply circumscribed. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 ... ("bad faith"
requirement).
Id. at 210 n.30.
75. See notes 54-58 supra and accompanying text.
76. Id.
77. In its discussion of civil liability in the other sections of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, the Hochfelder Court noted the limitations placed on the actions in which negligent
conduct constituted liability. The sections based on negligence contain shortened statutes of
limitation and various other procedural restrictions not evident in § 10(b). The Court
pointed out that if the same standard of conduct were allowed in § 10b suits plaintiffs could
avoid the procedural limitations of some sections by bringing actions under § 10(b) and yet
have no greater burden of proof. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206-11 (1976).
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Although the Straub court correctly cited the Hochfelder footnote
as limiting the availability of attorneys' fees under section 10(b), it
failed to realize that the Court was not referring to any additional
limitations to the bad faith exception.7 8 The Court was merely
pointing out that because fraud, not negilgence, was the gravamen
of a 10b-5 action, more than a factual finding of fraud would be
necessary to show a party acted in bad faith.7 9 The court's power
to award fees under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 is therefore limited, but only to the extent it would be in any type of litigation
requiring proof of fraud as a specific element of the offense.
Notwithstanding the apparent problems with the Straub decision, courts in subsequent cases have cited Straub as authority for
denying fees. Although the language of the decisions in these cases
follows Straub, the results of the cases and the reasoning employed
indicate dissatifaction with the Straub rationale.80 Thus, the better
78. The plaintiff in a § 10(b) or rule 10b-5 suit is already limited in his award because of
his burden of proof. He must prove that the statements made were false or misleading, and
that they were material, or that there was a manipulative device. In addition, the elements
of fraud and scienter must be proven.
79. This point is raised in Note, Rule 10b-5, supra note 1 at 341.
80. In Wright v. Heizer Corp., 503 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Ill. 1980), the court found sufficient bad faith conduct during the litigation to award bad faith fees, and therefore, did not
have to determine whether § 28(a) precluded bad faith fees. The plaintiff corporation, International Digisonics Corp., ("IDC") needed funds to fill its capital requirements. Heizer

Corp. agreed to provide funds in exchange for IDC stock. In a series of four transactions,
Helzer provided funds for which it received stock and stock warrants. It also elected three
members to IDC's board of directors. IDC was unable to repay any of the loans. This gave
Heizer the right to exercise its warrants. Upon exercise, Heizer would control more than
87% of IDC's stock. The plaintiff shareholders instituted suit after the fourth transaction,
alleging § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 violations by Heizer. The stockholders alleged that Heizer
received stock valued unreasonably low, and that the stock warrants were priced below
value, both of which defrauded the shareholders.
During the litigation, a fifth transaction occurred. IDC, still badly in need of funds, agreed
to pledge to Heizer 100% of the stock of its wholly owned subsidiary. In exchange, Heizer
agreed not to demand payments on notes already outstanding. Wright v. Heizer Corp., 411
F. Supp. 23, 30 (N.D. Ill. 1975). When this transaction occurred, Heizer Corp. controlled
IDC's board of directors, having elected three of the five members. The plaintiffs amended
their complaint to include this fifth transaction, alleging fraud under rule 10b-5.
The court, consistent with Straub, awarded bad faith fees for conduct during the litigation. This is because the fifth transaction which occurred after the suit had been filed, "contained elements directly related to the litigation process." Wright v. Heizer Corp. 503 F.
Supp. 802, 814 (N.D. Ill. 1980). First, it protected Heizer from the outcome of the litigation.
One of the defendant's witnesses admitted that Heizer intended to protect itself from any
damages award against it. In obtaining the subsidiary, Heizer would be able to pay the
award without dipping into its own funds.
Second, the transaction was a "device to discourage ..
a nuisance suit." The court determined that the transaction was equivalent to a frivolous defense because its purpose was
to harrass the plaintiff and delay his recovery. Id. at 814. See notes 28-31 supra and accom-
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position would seem to be that bad faith attorneys' fees are recoverable in implied actions arising from the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.
PROBLEMS IN DETERMINING BAD FAITH

Because of the heavey burden of proof required under some sections of the 1934 Act, courts have difficulty determining when bad
faith exists. If courts applied the standards applicable to non-securities cases in securities litigation, potentially all plaintiffs bringing suit could receive an award of bad faith attorneys' fees, because
proof of fraud, traditionally an element of bad faith is often
needed to prove a violation of the securities laws."' The courts' repanying text. Further, the transaction rendered any recovery meaningless, because Heizer
fully protected its own funds by obtaining IDC's subsidiary in order to pay potential
damages.
Although the facts in this case allowed the court to use the Straub rule, the substance of
the transaction could have been labeled conduct forming the cause of action. The court
found the pledge of IDC's subsidiary to be fraud on the shareholders. It forced the plaintiffs
to expend time and effort in continuing a lawsuit to vindicate established rights of full disclosure in all corporate transactions.
By labeling conduct as occurring during the litigation, the court avoided discussion of §
28(a). Had the court determined that the conduct in the fifth transaction constituted a violation of the securities laws it would have faced two problems. First, it would have had to
justify fees despite § 28(a) and Straub. Second, the court would have had to explain why the
conduct in the fourth transaction was not bad enough to award fees but the conduct in the
fifth transaction was bad enough to warrant fees. By sidestepping § 28(a), the court could
award bad faith fees yet remain consistent with Straub.
Similarly, in Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3797 (April 4, 1982) (No. 81-680), the court expressed a view in keeping with Heizer. In Huddleston the plaintiff shareholders instituted a suit against accountants who prepared the balance sheet for the corporation's prospectus. The trial court found
the balance sheet materially misleading. "The defendant's conduct... [was found to be] so
extreme as to be a form of intentional conduct or behavior equivalent to an intent to
deceive, manipulate or defraud." Id. at 545. The Fifth Circuit determined that this conduct
had nothing to do with the litigation proceedings. Id. at 559. In accordance with Straub, the
court denied plaintiff's request for bad faith attorneys' fees.
The Huddleston court recognized that § 28(a) limits recovery to actual damages, but
never stated that the section precludes attorneys' fees. The court based its denial of fees on
the trial court's finding that no bad faith conduct occurred during the litigation. The Huddleston court avoided the problem of determining whether defendant's conduct prior to the
litigation justified bad faith fees by remanding for a new trial. The remand was the result of
the Fifth Circuit's finding that the trial judge failed to include jury instructions regarding
two essential elements of a rule 10b-5 claim, i.e., causation and reliance, without proof of
which no rule lob-5 violation can be found. The court, however, indicated that it may have
considered the possibility of awarding fees for defendant's conduct notwithstanding Straub.
The court cited a recent commentary highly critical of Straub's restrictive interpretation of
the bad faith exception. Id. at 559 (citing Note, Rule lOb-5, supra note 1 at 338-42).
81. In Wright v. Heizer Corp., 503 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Ill. 1980), the court expressed
concern for this problem. "If proof of such recklessness alone were enough to constitute bad
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luctance to award fees in actions requiring a specific showing of
fraud has extended to suits arising under sections requiring a
lesser burden of proof, so that even where defendant's conduct is
clearly within the bad faith exception and the danger of awarding
fees to all potential plaintiffs is not present, fees are denied. 2
Problems in Applying the Standards
Recent cases demonstrate the problems courts have in applying
the bad faith exception. In Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor& Paine,"3
the district court found that the defendant violated section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5 by engaging in manipulative, deceptive and fraudulent conduct.8 4 The defendant broker, grossly indifferent to his
faith sufficient to justify an award of attorneys' fees, every derivative plaintiff prevailing in a
rule 10b-5 cause of action would be entitled to attorneys fees." Id. at 813.
Currently, courts are not in agreement as to whether proof of recklessness is sufficient to
support liability under rule 10b-5. In Franke v. Midwestern Oklahoma Dev. Auth., 428 F.
Supp. 719 (W.D. Okla. 1976), the court in dictum defined the kind of recklessness that could
constitute scienter.
In the context of an omissions case, reckless conduct may be defined as a highly
unreasonable omission, involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable, negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care and which
presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.
Id. at 725. Accord, Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978)(an investor's registered representative could be liable for reckless behavior under rule 10b-5 because of his fiduciary duty to the investor); Sundstrand
Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875
(1977)(recklessness can support an action for fraud or deceit at common law; therefore, it
would be inappropriate to construe rule lob-5 to require a stricter standard than common
law); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977)(agreeing with Sundstrand
but adding that any definition of recklessness should not be a liberal one lest any discernible distinction between scienter and negligence be obliterated). Cf. McLean v. Alexander,
599 F.2d 1190, 1197 (3d Cir. 1979); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017,
1024 n.2 (6th Cir. 1979); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 970 (1978).
See also, Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Define Scienter Under Rule lob-5:
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1977), Note, The Scienter Requirement
in SEC Injunctive Enforcement of Section 10b after Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 419 (1977), Note, Scienter and SEC Injunctive Suits: SEC v. Bausch &
Lomb, Inc. and SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 90 HARv. L. REV. 1018 (1977).
82. In Kirsch Co. v. Bliss & Laughlin Indus., Inc., [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L.
REP. (CCH) 97,993 (W.D. Mich. 1981), the plaintiffs alleged that upon defendant's acquisition of five percent of Kirsch's stock, the defendants failed to disclose their intent as required by § 13(d). See notes 50-53 supra and accompanying text. The court found the
defendants filed an intentionally false schedule 13(d) but reversed its prior award of attorneys' fees. Kirsch Co. v. Bliss & Laughlin Indus., Inc. 495 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
83. 288 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Va. 1968).
84. Id. at 848. The case involved alleged "churning" by the defendants. Churning, which
is specifically prohibited by rule 15cl-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-7, involves broker-dealer acts

1982]

Bad Faith Attorneys' Fees

duty to the customer, had used a customer's investment account to
generate commissions. 8 Nevertheless, the court found that this
conduct did not rise to the level of cases involving "groundless, oppressive, vexatious conduct"8 6 in which federal courts award fees.
In Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., the court refused to assess fees
against the defendant corporation for section 10(b) and rule 10b-5
violations although the defendant was held to have been "blinded
by a conflict of interest" and to have wantonly ignored the unfairness of the transaction. 8 The court denied the claim for attorneys'
fees because the conduct was not an exceptional situation reflecting wilful and persistent defiance of the law. 9
These cases demonstrate the court's difficulty in applying the
standards for awarding bad faith attorneys' fees. Both Stevens and
Bailey are examples of proven violations of law which would justify
an award of fees in a non-securities case. In Stevens the violation
involved gross misconduct and in Bailey the defendant acted wantonly. The courts in both cases indicated that in order for bad
faith fees to be awarded, the defendant's conduct must be more
than gross or wilful and wanton. The conduct and surrounding circumstances would have to constitute an exceptional situation.90
This finding is contrary to the current position taken in non-secur"designed to affect with or for any customer's account in respect to which [he] or his agent
or employee is vested with any discretionary power any transactions . . .which are excessive in size or frequency in view of the financial resources and character of such account."
The Securities Exchange Commission has made it clear that churning violates the general
fraud provisions of rule 15cl-2(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-2(c), which specifically states that
the scope of the section is not limited to specific devices, even though the account is not
formally discretionary. Walter S. Grubbs, 28 S.E.C. 323, 328 (1948); Behel, Johnson & Co.,
26 S.E.C. 163, 168 (1947), E.H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347, 380-82 (1945). Because
rule 15cl-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-3, which defines manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance, also occurs in rule 10b-5, there is reason to find rule 10b-5 violated by churning. See Russell L. Irish, S.E.C. Release No. 7687, [1964-66 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 77,274 (August 27, 1964), aff'd, 367 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 911 (1967).
85. Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 841 (E.D. Va. 1968).
86. Id. at 849. See, e.g., Chaney v. Western States Title Ins. Co., 292 F. Supp. 376 (D.
Utah 1968) where the jury found for the plaintiff on federal securities and common law
fraud claims. The court, however, refused to award fees because no extraordinary circumstances warranted an award. The court also recognized that § 28(a) could bar attorneys'
fees. Id. at 379 n.16(a). Accord, Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1974). The
case did not present " 'overriding considerations of justice' ... nor . . .fall within the limited exceptions to the contrary general rule." Id. at 1056. See note 62 supra and 90 infra.
87. 535 F.2d 982 (7th Cir. 1976).
88. Id. at 993.
89. Id. See note 60 supra.
90. See note 62 supra.
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ities litigation that proof of a violation of established law justifies
fees.
A solution exists for courts in securities litigation having difficulty defining conduct for awarding bad faith fees consistent with
the definition applied in non-securities litigation. Slight modification of standards applicable in non-securities litigation to fit the
issues determined in a securities litigation would allow consistency
of the bad faith exception on a broad scale but afford ready
adaption to securities cases.
A Proposal for Standards for Awarding Bad Faith Attorneys'
Fees in Implied Private Actions Under the 1934 Act
In order to develop a rule for bad faith fee awards, the several
types of securities violations must initially be identified and a separate analysis developed for each, because conduct required for securities violations varies under each implied action. The 1934 Act
contains provisions which recognize liability for conduct ranging
from a mere violation of statute to varying degrees of fraud. For
example, a violation of section 13(d) may incur liability for failing
to comply with its reporting provisions." At the other extreme, a
suit under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 requires not only proof of
fraud, but a specific showing of scienter.9 Because the burden of
proof placed on a plaintiff varies with the violation, the proof required to obtain bad faith fees should also vary with the violation.
Although securities fraud actions are most often brought under
both section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, the proposed standard for determining whether bad faith fees are available is based on rule 10b-5.
This proposed standard requires a two-prong analysis based on the
type of violation committed. Where a defendant has used a manipulative device, a court should award bad faith fees to any plaintiff
who can prove that the device has previously been found to violate
the rule.93 The second prong of the rule 10b-5 analysis would be
91. See notes 43, 50-53 supra and accompanying text.
92. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
93. Certain types of conduct have been enumerated as manipulative. Some common
schemes include rigged prices, furnishing false financial statements, wash sales and matched
orders. Wash sales are transactions involving no change in beneficial interest and matched
orders are those purchases/sales made with the knowledge that a substantially equal order
at the same time and price will be made by the same or different person for the purchase/
sale of the security.
Other examples of manipulative devices which are commonly attempted are agreements
to buy up, or corner, the entire supply or a major portion of a security. Contracts to effect
this kind of manipulation are not enforceable. Pegging a security is also an unlawful prac-
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used where the violation was based on defendant's omission or
misstatement of material fact. As in the manipulative device analysis, the plaintiff alleging misstatement or omission must also establish that the alleged misconduct has been found in violation of the
1934 Act. Meeting bad faith standards for this violation may be
more difficult than showing bad faith in cases involving a manipulative device, because the determination of materiality is an objective test which must be determined by the facts of the case."
Dividing rule 10b-5 into two parts gives courts a framework for
considering whether bad faith fees should be awarded. Notwithstanding the other elements of proof in a rule 10b-5 violation, the
plaintiff must raise an issue of either manipulation or materiality.
The availability of precedent determines whether the court can
award fees for the defendant's alleged violation of a clear legal
duty. Moreover, requiring the party moving for fees to support his
position with precedent gives that party the burden of proof. This
tice. A manipulator pegs when he places an order to purchase all shares of an issue at a
stated price, establishing a floor on the market. If the peg price is low, the transaction is a
violation. These two examples were recognized as possible schemes to defraud before the
enactment of the Securities Exchange Act. See Berle, Stock Market Manipulation, 38
COLUM. L. REV. 393, 395-96 (1938); Moore & Wiseman, Market Manipulation and the Exchange Act, 2 U. Cm. L. REV. 46, 67 (1964). For further discussion of manipulations see
JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE l0b-5, part 6 (revised ed. 1977).
94. The test for materiality is whether a reasonable man would attach importance to the
existence or nonexistence of a fact in determining his choice of action in the transaction in
question. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub
nom., Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 538(2)(a). The subjec'tive criteria are measured by defendant's actions. The courts' uncertainty in applying the
test cannot be resolved by establishing a list of facts which will be deemed material and
labeling all other facts immaterial, because the wide variety of circumstances which could
arise cannot be foreseen. As a result, courts generally take the position that materiality is a
fact question to be determined on the basis of all pertinent circumstances. Harnett v. Ryan
Homes, Inc., 496 F.2d 832, 837 (3d Cir. 1974)(examination of the record, i.e., all facts and
circumstances, is required to determine whether the district court's determination of materiality was erroneous); SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1306 (2d Cir. 1974)(materiality must
be determined on a case by case basis according to the fact pattern of each transaction);
SEC v. First Am. Bank & Trust Co., 481 F.2d 673, 680-81 (8th Cir. 1973)(materiality is a
question of-fact); Kasner v. H. Hentz & Co., 475 F.2d 119, 121 (5th Cir. 1973)(materiality is
a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact); Stier v. Smith, 473 F.2d 1205, 1208
n.9 (5th Cir. 1973)(materiality is a question of fact for the jury or trial court); Radiation
Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1973)(materiality must be determined on a case by case basis according to each specific fact pattern); Northwest Paper
Corp. v. Thompson, 421 F.2d 137, 138 (9th Cir. 1969)(where the trial court meticulously
analyzed each specific item of withheld information the ruling will stand); Crane Co. v.
Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 799 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822
(1970)(allegation of materiality is a matter of fact determined on appeal by whether the
record as a whole is clearly erroneous); Richard v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 553 (S.D.N.Y.
1967)(materiality is a matter to be determined upon all relevant facts and circumstances).
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is desirable in that the moving party should not be able to recover
his counsels' fees unless he has met the burden of proving both the
defendant's violation and bad faith conduct.
In contrast to rule 10b-5, under section 13(d) the plaintiff need
not prove fraud in order to prove a violation. The section allows
recovery for mere violation. If the plaintiff additionally proves
fraud, he should be entitled to recover bad faith fees because the
defendant's conduct, not only violated the statue but was proven
to be intentional.
This same standard would also apply to violations of rules
promulgated under section 14(a).15 For example, rule 14a-9 establishes a quality standard for proxy material." Courts generally
agree that negligence is the proper standard of liability for a rule
14a-9 violation.97 Under the proposed section 13(d) standard a
plaintiff able to prove more than a negligent omission or misstatement of material fact, i.e., scienter, would be entitled to an award
of bad faith fees. Although this proposed rule appears to conflict
with the standard applicable to materiality in rule 10b-5 violations,
it does not. Section 14(a) applies only to proxy material, whereas
rule 10b-5 applies to a broader range of information. This limited
application reduces the broad range of material information subjected to a rule 10b-5 violation, and therefore allows an easier de95.

See notes 42, 48-49 supra and accompanying text.
Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1981) states:
(a) No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any
proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication, written or oral, containing any statement which, at the time and in the light of the
circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any
material fact or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make
the statements therein not false or misleading or necessary to correct any statement in any earlier communication with respect to the solicitation of a proxy for
the same meeting or subject matter which has become false or misleading.
(b) The fact that a proxy statement, form of proxy or other soliciting material
has been filed with or examined by the Commission shall not be deemed a finding
by the Commission that such material is accurate or complete or not false or misleading, or that the Commission has passed upon the merits of or approved any
statement contained therein or any matter to be acted upon by security holders.
No representation contrary to the foregoing shall be made.
97. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777 (3d Cir. 1976)(courts discussing the rule favor applying a standard of negligence for determining liability); Gerstle v.
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1300-01 (2d Cir. 1973)(recklessness not required where
alleged misconduct is based on tort for which negligent conduct is sufficient for liability);
Berman v. Thomson, 403 F. Supp. 695, 699 (N.D. Ill. 1975)(simple negligence, without scienter, is enough to find liability); Norte & Co. v. Huffines, 304 F. Supp. 1096, 1109-10
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd in part, 416 F.2d 1189 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, Muscat v. Norte &
Co., 397 U.S. 989 (1970)(actual knowledge is not essential to establish a claim).
96.
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termination of what information is material. Once this decision is
made, fee shifting under the bad faith exception would be proper if
the defendant's conduct amounted to more than a negligent
violation.
Finally, the proposed standards for rule 10b-5 and section 13(d)
violations should apply to other implied private actions where appropriate. The rule 10b-5 standard could be used where the plaintiff's burden of proof includes fraud and scienter. The standard
proposed for section 13(d) could apply where the defendant's liability is established by a mere violation, but the plaintiff proves
that the conduct was fraudulent.
In sections where fraud is an element of the cause of action but
the burden of proof is not equal to that of a rule 10b-5 action,
which requires scienter, a third standard should apply. Similar to
rule 10b-5 cases, the plaintiff must establish by precedent that the
violation is fraudulent. If the plaintiff meets this burden and
proves a violation of established law, there should be a basis for
awarding bad faith fees. Lack of precedent could preclude the
plaintiff from recovering bad faith fees if the plaintiff, however,
can prove conduct beyond mere fraud, i.e., scienter, he should be
able to recover bad faith attorneys' fees. Unless this extra step in
the burden of proof is met courts, would confront the problem of
awarding bad faith fees to every successful litigant proving fraud.98
CONCLUSION

This proposal provides a better system for awarding bad faith
attorneys' fees than that currently used by the courts. By instituting the proposed standards for allowing recovery, courts would be
furthering the purpose of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
First, awarding bad faith fees for bad faith conduct gives litigants
a realistically effective cause of action. The possible recovery of
counsels' fees encourages a hesitant litigant to pursue his claim. In
addition, requiring defendants to pay plaintiff's counsel fees may
deter the defendant from bad faith conduct. Thus, the remedial
purpose of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 would be better
served by providing complete compensatory recovery in implied
private actions. The implied action itself is the result of the court's
power to promote the intended purpose of the Securities Exchange

98.

See note 81 supra.

372

[Vol. 13

Loyola University Law Journal

Act. Awarding bad faith attorneys' fees further effectuates this
purpose by encouraging the litigant to pursue his claim.
DEBRA

F. WEINER

